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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Mr. George Bush Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Bush

We have been aware for a number of years that the Soviets were developing an extensive follow-on series of offensive ballistic missiles. In the past, the evidence regarding future developments has tended to be scattered about in bits and pieces throughout the NIE or its annexes. I recommend this year that an effort be made to consolidate the considerable array of evidence now available on future systems and that we highlight same, either as a separate chapter or as a separate and distinct section highlighted within Chapter 2 of the new NIE 11-3/8.

In 1973, I provided USIB with the results of a year-long study forecasting that the Soviets would probably introduce as many as fifteen major new or heavily-modified offensive ballistic missile systems prior to the 1982-83 period. The research supporting such a projection was based upon an examination of all missile testing by the Soviets since 1953. The patterns which emerged provided the first distinctive new methodology for forecasting future offensive ballistic missile systems developed by the Intelligence Community during the past two decades.

The Guided Missile and Aerospace Intelligence Committee studied the Air Force findings for more than a year and published an extensive report corroborating them. During the past year alone, we have acquired hard evidence confirming at least eight of the forecasted fifteen or so systems. Now - I am informed - your Office of Weapons Intelligence has brought all of these materials together and achieved a definitive appreciation regarding future Soviet offensive ballistic missile systems.

I believe the time has come to highlight the results of our community efforts in both a distinctive and dramatic way - so that our policy planners and decision makers can have a clear understanding of the enormous momentum behind Soviet developmental programs.

Classified by:

LCC/7, NQ USAN

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Accordingly, I commend the work of OWI to your personal attention and solicit your direct support in highlighting the results of their findings in the next NIE 11-3/8. I believe the time has come to let the national leadership know what the Soviets have in gestation. Explicitly, comprehensively, and appropriately highlighted. Last year's Executive Summary to the NIE contained but one brief sentence on the subject. *

With warmest regards Copy to: Major General, USAT ACS/Intelligence

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* This sentence is the second full sentence of the entire NIE: " [The Swiet] are also moving short with the development of swers ICBMs Leyon I there now being belleyed, " (Su also bara. 34, Wi T., paras. 112-115, Vol. IT incl. ACSI, As

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